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HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE:
THE LEGALITY OF MOTION PICTURE SPLITS
UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
JAMES S. GORDONt

HARRY SLEy, Philadelphia garage owner and sometime theatre
operator, recently went to court to overhaul the mechanics of motion
picture film distribution. As owner of the now defunct Viking Theatre
in Philadelphia, Sley sued his major competitors, the Stanley Warner
Corporation and William Goldman Theatres, Inc., for damages resulting from their alleged conspiracy with the major motion picture
distributors. In the trial court, the gravamen of the complaint was a
conspiracy among Goldman, Stanley Warner, and six major distributors allegedly resulting in discriminatory treatment against Viking.
Invoking the Sherman Act, Sley attempted to prove that his bids for
film product were rejected despite their superiority to his competitors'
bids, that he was discriminatorily denied rental adjustments and adjustments on the playing time for films he did receive, that he was
required to play pictures for an excessively long time while Stanley
Warner and Goldman had more rapid turnover, and finally, that he
was required to pay more than his competitors for films he received.
Suffering a directed verdict on these grounds, he changed his argument in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To his list of
complaints, Sley added the allegation that his competitors' agreement
to split or allocate film product between them, without bidding competitively for it, was a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Both the
old and the new arguments were rejected by the Court of Appeals.'
Before the Supreme Court, Sley ignored the case he tried below, and,
concentrating exclusively on the Goldman-Stanley Warner agreement
to split product, he argued that such a split was per se illegal because
it did not include all exhibitors. The final round in the litigation
ended in a draw. Faced with the necessity of deciding the legality of
"splits," the Court itself split four-four, affirming per curiam the
decision for defendants below.2 In the absence of an authoritative
t Member, Illinois Bar; Member, Board of Editors, Volume 74.
1. Viking Theater Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1953).
aff'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 123.
2. Ibid.
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Supreme Court opinion, the affirmance of the Court of Appeals decision left the opinion below as another landmark in the continuing
antitrust litigation over the legality of splits.
In Viking and its kindred cases, the theatre operators of a given
local exhibition market have agreed to divide the available film product among themselves, each obtaining an aliquot part for which the
others would not compete.
In practice this amounts to taking a group of pictures on the
release schedules of one or more distributors and dividing the
pictures, assuming two theatre circuits, into two equal lists. The
one who did not arrange the lists has the right to the first choice
of lists. The next group of films will be split into two lists by the
other party, and again the one who did not do the arranging will
have the first choice.8
This method of allocating films simply throws all films to be released
during a particular period of time into one hotchpot and provides
for its division by agreement among exhibitors without regard to the
distributor and without competitive bidding for the allocated product.
So described, splits stand out clearly as agreements not to compete,
alarmingly similar in design and impact to other such agreements well
known to antitrust lawyers since the turn of the century. Unlike other
forms of market division which have customarily been held per se
illegal under the Sherman Act, splits not only have avoided this fate,
4
but have obtained the endorsement of the Department of Justice.
An additional peculiarity is that the parties most directly aggrieved
by the elimination of competition among film exhibitors-the film
distributors whose revenues would rise were competitive bidding the
rule-have in most cases acquiesced. Many explanations have been
offered for this passivity, some conflicting, some confusing, and some
3. Comment, An Experiment in Preventive Antitrust: Judicial Regulation of tle
Motion Picture Exhibition Market Under the Paramount Decrees, 74 YALE L.J. 1040, 1109
(1965) [hereinafter cited as COMMENT]; for a general discussion of splits see COrtMENT at
1062, 1072-74 and 1108-10.
4. See Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Hearings Before Subcommittee
of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 651-52 (1953).
For an example of the Justice Department's reaction to a split involving all local exhibitors, see Letter from Assistant Attorney General Loevinger to Edward Bennett Williams,
Esq., dated June 25, 1962, Appendix to Brief for Petitioner, pp. 3a-4a, Viking Theater
Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., supra note 1. On this occasion, however, the
Justice Department refused to comment on the legality of splits in general. See also Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE
L.J. 775, 826 (1965) [hereinafter cited as BORK].
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which seem to have no economic basis.5 The most plausible explanation suggests that any course of action other than distributor acquiescence is excessively costly. Faced with a split, a distributor who refuses
to acquiesce can either refuse to deal with the conspiring exhibitors
or sue them on an antitrust claim for the damages he sustains. Both
alternatives would require the distributor to jeopardize the ongoing
relationship between a supplier and his outlet in a market where the
latter provides the total source of revenue. Bringing suit against the
exhibitors is apparently fraught with another kind of risk. Distributor
and exhibitor counsel suggest that this course of action would result
in an immense volume of litigation the ultimate cost of which might
be greater to nonacquiescing distributors than the costs of tacit acquiescence. Although these explanations may not seem persuasive,
apparently they have encouraged distributor acquiescence and discouraged a concerted pattern of litigation by distributors to test the
legality of splits. Two facts are certain, however. Splits are the prevailing mode of market allocation for film producL And thus far the
isolated judicial reaction to splits has been puzzling.
Review of the presently reported opinions dealing with splits indicates that each of the several theories of legality is created out of
5. The following explanations are most frequently offered for distributor acquiescence:
(a) splits give the distributor certainty of play dates and market coverage for all his
product; (b) splits allow booking far in advance of the date booking would take place in
a competitive market, since, without competitive bidding, exhibitors will agree to license
films "blind," that is, without seeing them at a special screening; (c) splits enable distributors to give adjustments on film rentals when a film does poorly, adjustments which
would be impossible under competitive bidding due to the fear of exhibitor suits based
on alleged discrimination. See text accompanying notes 78-83 infra; (d) since splits allow
adjustments of rental according to how well a film does, a split enables a sharing of risk
between exhibitors and distributors which competitive bidding would prevent: (e) distributors willingly forego higher profits because they do not want "blood money"; (f) distributors fear litigation from dissatisfied exhibitors who lose out in competitive bidding.
See text accompanying notes 78-83 infra; (g) distributors try to preserve outlets to avoid
monopsony in the exhibition market. See text accompanying notes 84-87 infra; (h) dis.
tributors fear to sue conspiring exhibitors for the reasons discussed in the text, although
it is well known in the industry that they send out letters to many local markets announcing their refusal to consent and their intention to hold the splitting exhibitors liable for
damages. Interview with various exhibitor and distributor counsel, New York City, May
14, 1965.
6. Among the exhibition situations discussed in ComtENr, splitting of product was
found to be the modus vivendi in San Jose, Cal., Suburban Philadelphia (Cheltenham), Pa.,
New Haven, Conn., Fayetteville, N.C., Poughkeepsie, N.Y., and Seattle, Wash., to mention
only a few of many instances. For the prevalence of splitting and the relative scarcity of
competitive bidding, see Cassady, Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture
Distribution and Price Making, 31 So. CAL. L RExv. 150, 161-165 (1958).
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whole cloth. The first of these theories was formulated by Judge
Palmieri in United States v. Loew's, Inc.,7 where the National Theatres
Circuit (National General) was petitioning under the Paramount
decrees to acquire a new facility in San Jose, California. The petitioner's competitors appeared as amici curiae and protested the acquisition of the grounds that it would unduly restrain competition,
claiming, among other things, that National's participation in a split
demonstrated its anticompetitive proclivities. Judge Palmieri, the
judicial overseer of the industry under the Paramountdecrees, rejected
the claim:
Concededly, any arrangement whereby exhibitors agree with
each other that they will not compete in the buying of the product
cannot be countenanced; although it is equally clear that splits
of product8 with the consent of both distributors and exhibitors
are proper.
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Palmieri relied on Justice Douglas'
opinion in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,9 where the
Court refused to force competitive bidding on the industry; on Royster
Drive-in Theatres v. American Broadcasting-ParamountTheatres, ° a
private treble damage suit; and on an article in the Southern California
Law Review describing motion picture distribution practices."1 None
of the three is authority for the proposition that distributor acquiescence renders legal what may be an otherwise illegal agreement not
to compete. Paramount merely held that there were lawful means
other than competitive bidding to allocate motion pictures; it did not
hold that non-competitive allocation was permissible. Similarly, the law
review article cited merely described splits; it presented no arguments
for their legality. Finally, the Royster Drive-in case made no ruling
at all on the legality of splits. In fact, the Court said,
Whatever the legality of this system-and we are not called
upon to deal with that issue here-it probably tends to keep
more exhibitors in business than would be the case if competitive
bidding were the universal rule. 2
7.

TRADE REG.

8.

Id. at 76374.

REP. (1962 Trade Cas.)

J70347, at 76373 (S.DN.Y. June 1, 1962).

9. 334 U.S. 131, 162, 165-66 (1948).
10. 268 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1959).
11. Cassady, Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture Distribution and
Price Making, supra, note 6.
12. 268 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1959), (Emphasis added). The Royster case was particularly
interesting in that plaintiff seems to have attacked the legality of competitive bidding. As
might be expected, the Second Circuit upheld the legality of competition, ibid.
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Despite the absence of support, so impressive was Judge Palmieri's
statement of the law that the Ninth Circuit accepted it without question. However, in this case, Samuel Goldwyn Productions,Inc. v. Fox
West Coast Theatres Corp.,13 a producer's' 4 product was split by exhibitors without his consent. Therefore, the court upheld a $300,000
verdict in favor of the producer.
A second theory of legality, although developed in disregard of
Palnieri's rule, has a similarly vague origin and rests upon equally
dubious foundations. This theory seems to have been specially formulated by the Third Circuit in response to Harry Sley's contention in
Viking that a split which does not include all exhibitors in the relevant
competitive area is per se unlawful under the Sherman Act. The court,
careful to point out that the legality of splits in general was not in
issue, went on to develop, on the facts presented in Viking, the following rule:
... [T]he failure to include all exhibitors in the split system will
not render it illegal in the absence of evidence that it was so
employed as to unreasonably restrict the competitive market, or
had this result. [Citing Brown v. Western Massachusetts Theatres,
Inc. and Schad v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.]15
At the outset, it should be noted that the Third Circuit's emphasis
on the effect of the split on competition renders distributor acquiescence irrelevant; the presence or absence of acquiescence could hardly
alter the competitive effect of a split in any given exhibition market.
In fact, had acquiescence been considered significant, the decision
might have gone the other way, because, as to at least two of the major
distributors joined as defendants, the court found no evidence of acquiescence. 16 Second, the Viking rule has no precedential support; the
two cases upon which the Court apparently relied are far from controlling. Brown v. Western Massachusetts Theatres, Inc.17 involved a
private treble damage action brought by an exhibitor in Greenfield,
Massachusetts, against his competitors and the major film distributors.
13. 194 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd sub nom. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., Inc., 328 F.2d 190 (th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880

(1964).
14. Producers and distributors are, in the case of the seven majors, vertically integrated,

and in all other cases herein will be treated as if they were, since the producers' and
distributors' interests are identical.

15. 320 F.2d at 293.
16. "There is no direct evidence that CoLUmBA or UNrvmasAL acquiesced in the split,
but their pictures were, nevertheless, included on lists prepared by
GoLWAN." Id. at 292.

17. 288 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1961).

STANLEY WARNxE

and
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Plaintiff argued neither that splits were per se illegal nor that they
were illegal, as Sley argued, only when all exhibitors were not members. The gravamen of Brown's complaint was "that the distributors
jointly agreed with the exhibitors [plaintiff's competitors] to divide the
bulk of their first run product ... thus depriving plaintiff of an opportunity to obtain the supply of first run pictures needed for effective
competition."' 8 All plaintiff could prove was the bare fact that his
two competitors did not bid against each other for product; he did
not prove the existence of an agreement to split such as was established
in Viking. Relying therefore on the doctrine of parallel action, 0
Brown was required to show that the rational explanation of the
parallel behavior was a conspiracy to deprive him of product. However, the Court found that the most rational explanation of the parallel
behavior was the desire to avoid ruinous competition:
Competitive bidding was suicidal for exhibitors. The Antitrust
laws do not require a business to cut its own throat. Even plaintiff himself resisted three-way bidding, and in place of this, all
three exhibitors (including plaintiff) ultimately agreed2 0on a division of the first run movies of the several distributors.
It is therefore obvious that the decision in Brown has no bearing whatever on cases involving (1) a proven agreement to split product with
distributor participation; (2) an attack on the legality of a proven agreement; or (3) an attack, as in Viking, on the agreement because it does
not include all exhibitors. Consequently, citation of Brown by the
Third Circuit in support of its rule is inexplicable.
More inexplicable, however, is the citation of Schad v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.,21 a case decided in 1943 before the Paramount litigation. The law on which the Schad court relied in regard
to the allocation of product between theatres has been superseded
completely by the Paramount decrees. In Schad, the court sustained a
dismissal of the complaint. Today the plaintiff would be entitled to
summary judgment. Schad is not merely bad law; after Paramount it
18.

Id. at 304.

19. This doctrine holds that, in the absence of any rational business justification for
closely similar behavior by businessmen, a conspiracy will be inferred, especially where
each actor was fully aware of the other's behavior. See Theatre Enterprises Inc. v. Panramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297
F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961).
20. 288 F.2d at 305. Ultimate agreement came after the period in suit.
21. 136 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1943).
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is a paradigm case of restraint of trade in motion picture exhibition.Thus the Third Circuit's rule purports to be derived from precedent
which in fact is non-existent. Like Judge Palmieri's rule of distributor
acquiescence, the rule in Viking is entitled to no more weight than
any ipse dixit can obtain from the reasons given in its support. Unfortunately, no reasons were given, and it is puzzling that an agreement
not to compete which destroys all competition in a relevant market is
legal unless it can be proved that such agreement unreasonably
restrains competition in that market. After all, such agreements not to
compete are not res nova, and it is well settled that regardless of their
reasonableness, they are conclusively presumed illegal.2
Judge Palmieri's rule and the Third Circuit's rule, despite their
dubious origins, are now the law of the land. Seldom has the law on
22. Schad provides a beautiful illustration of a bygone era of distribution and exhibi-

tion practices. Defendant Warner Bros. Circuit had been leasing plaintiff Schad's Astor
Theatre in Reading, Pennsylvania, and by contractual arrangement with Twentieth
Century Fox, Warner was playing half of Fox's product on first run. Defendant Wilmer &
Vincent Theatre Co. was playing the other half at its Embassy. When Warner's lease on
plaintiff's Astor expired, it leased the State, a subsequent-run house owned by Wilmer &
Vincent, and moved it up to first run. The "undisputed facts" beyond the ensuing arrangement are stated by the court:
Wilmer & Vincent, which had been seeking the right to exhibit the entire Fox
product, now conditioned its agreement to lease the State to Warner upon Warner's
relinquishing its claim to one-half of the Fox product. On November 7, 1940, Warner
surrendered its Fox contract and on November 29, 1940, Fox executed a contract
giving Wilmer & Vincent all of the Fox product for a three year period, the Fox
pictures to be exhibited at the Embassy and the Ritz [a Wilmer & Vincent theatre,
which the court described as "B Grade']. From November, 1940 to May, 1941

Warner operated the Astor without Fox pictures. After Warner moved to the State
it exhibited Vitagraph pictures alone. After May, 1941, the plaintiffs, who were
without sufficient pictures to run at the Astor, entered into a five year pooling
agreement with Emmanuel [a competitor] . . . whereby the best pictures available
to the pool were to be played at the Astor. . .. The pooling agreement cost the
plaintiffs $50,000 a year. During the 194041 season Wilmer and Vincent had under
contract 70 pictures, each to be exhibited for a week. Some of the Fox films were
exhibited at the State or Ritz, which theatres paid lower rentals for them than the
Embassy or Astor.
136 F.2d at 995.
Under the existing case law, the above statement of facts is wholly sufficient to prove

that the particular split in court in Schad was, to use the Third Circuit's language in
Viking, "so employed as to unreasonably restrict the competitive market, or had this
result." 320 F.2d at 293. Thus the Schad case is totally inappropriate for the purpose for
which it was cited.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing);
United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (price fixing); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afd, 175 US. 211 (1899)
(market division). See generally, Boax.
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so important a subject been so obscure. It is clear that in a suit brought
by a distributor against exhibitors, his acquiescence vel non is determinative under the Palmieri rule. When the distributor does not
acquiesce, it is unclear whether Palmieri's rule protects him from a
suit by an exhibitor who refuses to participate in an existing split;
in Viking two distributors who apparently did not acquiesce were not
dismissed as defendants. 24 When an exhibitor sues, alleging that a split
is unlawful solely on the grounds that it does not include all exhibitors, it is reasonably certain that under the Viking rule he will have to
prove only that the split was so "employed as to unreasonably restrict
the competitive market, or had this result. '25 He apparently need not
concern himself with distributor consent. And in some cases it may
be unclear whether either the Viking rule or the Palmieri rule applies,
2
or whether a combination of both is required.
Although the present law on splits is obscure in origin as well as in
application, what is far more remarkable is that the opinions seem
to have been written in a vacuum, completely independent of the
traditional antitrust rules governing market division and price fixing,
two restraints which seem too closely analogous to be ignored.
Market divisions between competitors have always been condemned
as inconsistent with the Sherman Act because they have no other purpose than to stifle competition. In one of the first cases arising under
the Sherman Act, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 7 the
Court found illegal an agreement between competing manufacturers
of pipe to divide the market by assigning each party to the agreement
an exclusive territory in which no other member could compete. Despite the defendants' argument that the agreement prevented ruinous
24.
25.
26.

See note 16, supra.
320 F.2d at 293.
This confusion is illustrated by the charge given a Connecticut jury, upon de-

fendants' request, which merged Palmieri's rule on distributor acquiescence and the
Viking rule (somewhat doctored) on unreasonable restraints. Judge Clare charged:
It has been testified that during certain periods the exhibitors in New Britain and
in Hartford agreed to a "split of product," so-called, to avoid competitive bidding....

In the absence of any showing that the split of product was a part of a plan to
monopolize or to conspire in restraint of trade, there is nothing illegal about a division . . . of product between motion pictures exhibitors, with the concurrence or
acquiescence of the distributors concerned.

Berlin Drive-In Theatre v. Stanley Warner Management Corp., Civil case No. 8501 (D.C.
Conn. 1965) (unreported). Plaintiff exhibitor sued the distributors and his competitors
who participated in a split which he had refused to join for depriving him unreasonably

of the film product he wanted on the run he thought his theatre deserved. Defendants
won the jury verdict and were awarded their costs.
27.

85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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competition, Judge Taft stated that "[n]o matter what the excuse for
the combination by defendants in restraint of trade, the illegality of
the means stamps it as a conspiracy, and so brings it within that term
of the federal statute." 28 This rule of per se illegality has been reaffirmed many times and includes closely analogous restraints such as
price fixing.29 In all of these cases, defendants have argued that unchecked competition in a free market would be ruinous, and in every
one the Court has unequivocably rejected the argument. As Justice
Douglas wrote in Socony-Vacuum,3 0
... [T]his

Court has consistently and without deviation adhered
to the principle that price fixing agreements [and division of
markets] are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no
showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed
as a defense.3 1
This persistent animus against agreements not to compete has its
origin in a long standing hostility to private interference with the
pricing mechanism as a means of allocating society's economic resources. In the language of the Court,
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged
in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the pricefixing group were in no position to control the market, to the
extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would
be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The
Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects that
vital part of our economy against any degree of interference.
Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or
not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy
28. 85 Fed. at 294.
29. See supra note 23. But cf., Chicago Ed. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918), where the setting of call prices on a grain exchange was upheld against a Sherman
Act attack; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 US. 344 (1933), where a joint
selling agency among producers of bituminous coal was held legal despite the fact that
price fixing ias at the heart of the agency's operation. To the extent that these cases hold
that agreements in restraint of trade, created for that purpose and with that effect, can
be justified under the rule of reason, they have been thoroughly discredited. United States
v. Socony-Vacaum Oil Co., 310 US. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.. 273
US. 892 (1927). See also BoRK. However, to the extent that the cases first dted in this
footnote show a willingness to permit agreements in restraint of trade which are ancillary
to business relationships which have been entered into to obtain a greater efficiency or
to achieve other valid purposes, those cases might support the analysis of motion picture
splits which is advanced in the text accompanying notes 56-80. See particularly the dis.
cussion of the one defense of certain splits the validity of which is reasonably certain, in
the text accompanying notes 75-80.
30. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note 29.
31. Id. at 218.
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or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous
competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing
conspiracies.

. .

. Whatever may be its peculiar problems and

characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements
are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.32
And the mere fact that a price-fixing scheme is vertically imposed by
a manufacturer on its dealers or consented to by him will not save it.
In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,33 a resale price maintenance
program vertically imposed on Parke, Davis' drug retailers was held
per se illegal. As the Court stated,
The manufacturer is thus the organizer of a price-maintenance
combination ... in violation of the Sherman Act. Under that Act

"competition not combination, should be the law of trade," . ..
and "a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity . . .is illegal per se." 3 4

This hostility to interference with the price system derives from the
belief that unimpeded price movements best allocate resources according to consumer desires. For example, it is a truism that when
demand exceeds supply price will generally rise, thus encouraging
resources to move into this now more profitable area, thereby increasing supply.3 5 Although this is an oversimplification of a very complex
economic theory, it still remains true by and large, that with free
price movements, consumer wants determine the allocation of society's
resources.3 6 When, therefore, artificial interferences with price are
present, a misallocation results. Thus if prices are kept artificially
high in a given area and barriers to new entry are low, overinvestment
will occur. Conversely, if prices are kept artificially low, too few resources will be attracted to this sector of the economy and some consumer wants will go unsatisfied. In a freely competitive economy, all
buyers or sellers are price takers. No one individual has the power to
interfere with the market price determined by the impersonal interaction of supply and demand. When competition is eliminated, however, through agreements not to compete among vendors or purchasers,
32. Id. at 221-22.
33. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
34. id. at 47 (Emphasis added).
35. LEmWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLoCATION 14-15, 27-34 (rev. ed. 1965).
See generally, SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 367-78 (3d ed. 1955).
36. LEFrwIcH, supra note 35, at 16, 27-34. For an intensive and technical analysis of the

operation of supply and demand and the role of consumer choice in the process, see
ScrrovsRY, WELFARE AND COMPEITION, ch. 1 and generally (rev. ed. 1955).
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power over price and output results. Although many purposes for the
antitrust laws have been suggested, all courts and commentators have
always agreed that the major impetus behind these laws was the fear
of the power over price and output which had been obtained by the
large trusts3 7 For this reason, preservation of competition has always
been considered the foundation of the antitrust laws. 38 It is against
this background that the market division and price-fixing cases discussed above must be read. Market division among competitors eliminates all competition between them in a given area, and price fixing
eliminates competition in the most important aspect of a sale or
purchase.
Both the law and economics set forth above seem as applicable to
splits as to the traditional types of agreements not to compete. An
agreement whereby exhibitors decide not to bid against one another
for film product, such product being in shorter supply today than ever
before,39 seems to have no other purpose than to lower prices. In fact,
in most instances when splits have appeared in court there is undisputed evidence that distributors received lower than competitive
prices. In the Royster Drive-in case, for example, the Court made the
following statement:
The so-called "split" system, whereby exhibitors divide the list
of available pictures and then approach the distributors separately on that basis, enables them to purchase films at lower
prices. 40
And Simon Fabian, the President of the Stanley Warner Corporation,
testified in Viking that the sole purpose of the Philadelphia split was
to eliminate all competition between his and the Goldman theatres, 41
thereby increasing the number of films on which his theatres had no
competition whatsoever. These films might therefore be obtained at
lower prices by negotiating with the distributor who had no alternaSee THOR=EL, THE FEDERAL ANmTIRUST PoLIcY 22532 (1954).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 US. 392, 397 (1927), where the
Court stated:
Our view of what is a reasonable restraint of commerce is controlled by the recognized
purpose of the Sherman Law itself. Whether this type of restraint [price fixing] is
reasonable or not must be judged in part at least in the light of its effect on competition, for... it cannot be doubted that the Sherman Law and the judicial decisions
interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition.
39. See CoziMMNT at 1101, n. 214.
40. 268 F.2d at 250.
41. Record, p. 79-82, cited in Brief for Petitioner, p. 7.
37.
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tive Philadelphia outlet.42 In the same suit, William Goldman, the
other party to the agreement, testified that competitive bidding was
"disastrous" to his economic success 43 because it drove up the price
for films. 44 These views were confirmed on behalf of the distributors
by William Mansell, the Warner Brothers branch manager, who explained under cross examination in Viking that if there had been no
split, and Goldman had been bidding against Stanley Warner for
Warner Brothers' pictures, such bidding would have increased Warner
45
Brothers' revenues.
All available evidence indicates that similar testimony could be
obtained from exhibition markets where splits are prevalent, from
coast to coast. 46 It is therefore beyond cavil that splitting interferes
with the pricing mechanism by substituting private agreements not
to compete for competitive price making. The net effect is a misallocation of some of the nation's economic resources and a distortion
of the normal investment pattern. By collusively lowering their costs,
exhibitors arrogate to themselves profits which would otherwise be
earned by the producers. Thus exhibition becomes more profitable
than it would be under competitive conditions, and production less
profitable. As a result, exhibition commands too many resources, and
production, too few. Accordingly it would be expected that without
splitting there would be fewer theatres in existence. The accuracy of
this prediction is illustrated by the exhibitors' most popular defense
of their split system: "ruinous competition." The amici curiae brief
for the nation's two largest exhibitor trade associations in the Viking
case asserted that the Court should sustain the validity of splits
because: "The primary benefit of splitting to exhibitors is survival.
Films reach exhibitors who could not afford them under competitive
bidding." 47 Moreover, it is an equally reasonable expectation that
without splitting and with the concomitantly higher returns to producers a larger number of films would be produced. To the extent that
the antitrust laws are meant to remedy misallocations of economic
resources and the frustration of consumer wants, the motion picture
exhibitors' agreement not to compete would seem the paradigm case
42. Record, p. 81-82, cited in Brief for Petitioner, p. 7.
43. Record, p. 1752, cited in Brief for Petitioner, p. 6.
44. Record, p. 1634-36, cited in Brief for Petitioner, p. 7.
45. Record, p. 2010, cited in Brief for Petitioner, p. 10.
46. The elimination of competition and the concomitant lowering of costs of film
rentals to exhibitors was the intent and effect of splits in the situations cited in note 6
supra.
47. Brief for Theatre Owners of America, Inc. and Allied States Assoc. of Motion
Picture Exhibitors, as amici curiae, p. 9.
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for the invocation of the per se rule against market division and
price fixing.
In the context of the law which has emerged from over a half
century of antitrust litigation, the two rules now governing splits
seem particularly erroneous. Judge Palmieri's rule, which depends on
the presence or absence of distributor consent in judging the legality
of splits, has nothing whatever to do with competition. And the Viking
rule, although asking whether or not a split has unreasonably restrained competition, presupposes that such an agreement not to compete, by itself and without more, is insufficient to establish a Sherman
Act violation.
The doctrine that the consent of the party directly affected by an
unlawful agreement not to compete renders that agreement legal is
unique, to say the least, in antitrust law. Considering the concern of
the antitrust laws to prevent misallocation of resources, 48 it is obvious
that acquiescence to a misallocation is totally immaterial. Moreover,
in emphasizing distributor acquiescence, Palmieri's rule seems to have
been created in total disregard of the law of resale price maintenance
as crystallized in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.49 If manufacturer
imposition will not save an otherwise illegal combination tampering
with price structure, certainly a less affirmative showing of consent in
the form of mere acquiescence should not have this effect.
The Viking rule is similarly erroneous. It will be remembered that
this rule holds splits failing to include all exhibitors legal in the
absence of evidence that the split was employed to restrict competition
unreasonably or had this effect.5 0 But in fashioning this rule the Third
Circuit, perhaps mindful of the per se illegality of any private agreement tampering with the price structure, relied on its finding that
There is no evidence in this record from which it may be inferred
that any artificiality of price structure existed; in fact plaintiff
made no attempt to offer such evidence.5 '
Because this finding flies in the face of much of defendants' testimony,
some of which has been described above,5 2 and ignores the general industry understanding of the purpose and effect of splits,53 it should
48. See notes 32, 37, 38 supra.
49. 362 U.S. 29 (1960); see text at note 34 supra. See also United States v. Schrader's
Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911). Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
50. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
51. 320 F.2d at 293.
52. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.

53. See text accompanying note 47 supra, for quotation from Brief for amici curiae,
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have been reversed by the Supreme Court as clearly erroneous. Stripped
of the support provided by this erroneous finding, the court's rule is
nonsense. If an agreement is conclusively presumed to be per se illegal
because it is "a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
S. ."54 it is hardly necessary also to prove that the agreement was "so
employed as to unreasonably restrict the competitive market."' '
If the reading of the governing antitrust law presented here is
correct, splits are per se unlawful. Like price fixes and market divisions,
exhibitor agreements not to compete in the licensing of film product
interfere with the price mechanism and thereby misallocate resources.
It is too late to argue, as the price fixers and market dividers have
argued since the turn of the century, that ruinous competition is a
defense to such antitrust violations. And to admit that splits protect
exhibitors who would be eliminated by competition is but to acknowledge their pernicious effect.
A more respectable defense under present law, however, might be
suggested. The argument is that if the distributor divides his own
product among exhibitors, that is, if the split is vertically imposed,
the per se rule is inappropriate. In only one Supreme Court case,
the nation's two largest exhibitor trade associations, which indicates the industry's belief
in the effectiveness of splits in lowering prices for films and thus creating a price structure
which could hardly be termed anything but "artificial." The effect achieved by the Stanley
Warner and William Goldman companies in Philadelphia, text accompanying notes 41-45
supra, has been duplicated in most of the splitting situations known to the author.
54. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (Emphasis added).
55. 320 F.2d at 293 (Emphasis added). If the facts contained in the record are reasonably
complete, the Third Circuit should not be seriously criticized for the result affirmed In the
Viking case. Careful examination of the record indicates that the plaintiff suffered a total
failure of proof on the issue of whether the split of product between its competitors
worked any damages to the Viking Theatre. There is no causal relationship to be found
in the full eight volumes of the record between the Viking's business losses and anything
but the inexperience of its management and the high risks of the industry. Nor Is there
any convincing evidence to support the allegation of conspiracy between the distributors
and Viking's competitors. Under the test suggested by this article, text following note 56
infra, certain aspects of the Philadelphia split may appear illegal. Notwithstanding this
prospect, however, before a plaintiff can establish a claim for damages, an unbroken chain
of Sherman Act cases holds that he must show that his damages were caused In substantial
part by the illegal agreement not other factors. Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation"
Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 691 (1963); Note,
Standing to Sue for Treble Damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLuM. L.
REv. 570 (1964). Research points to the tentative conclusion that It is unlikely that a

theatre owner not participating in a split of product among his competitors can be
damaged by it. Rather, he might profit: his competition is diminished and he is able to
compete for all films he may desire to exhibit, not merely for some part of them its
lie
would be were he a participant.
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White Motor Co. v. United States,0 0 has a similar defense rescued an
otherwise illegal market division. In White Motor the Court faced a
market division which, like splits in the motion picture industry,
totally destroyed all competition between the dealers of a major national truck manufacturer.5 7 Three Justices, in vigorous dissent, would
have applied the per se rule:
the rule of reason is inapplicable to agreements made solely for
the purpose of eliminating competition. . . . To admit, as does
petitioner, that competition is eliminated under its contracts is,
under our cases, to admit a violation of the Sherman Act. No
justification, no matter how beneficial, can save it from that
interdiction.5 8
The majority, however, was persuaded by the defendant's argument
that the market division in this case was distinguishable from those
in the cases supporting the dissenters' view, since here the market division appeared to be vertically imposed. Conceding the per se illegality
of horizontal market division agreements, the majority was unsure
whether vertical territorial limitations deserved such treatment. In a
display of candor, the majority said, "We do not know enough of the
economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge
to be certain [of their illegal purpose and effect]."5 ;0 To resolve the
issue, the Court reversed an order granting summary judgment for
the United States and remanded for trial. Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion made it clear that if after trial it appeared that the
arrangement was prompted primarily by the dealers rather than by
White, he would then vote with the dissenters. 0 For, in that event, the
territorial division would be more analogous to the horizontal restraints traditionally prohibited by the per se rule. White Motor,
therefore, indicates that when a market allocation restraint among
competing businessmen does not originate with them, but rather is
forced upon them by their supplier, the Supreme Court will not apply
the rule of per se illegality-instead, the Court will permit the introduction of evidence on economic justifications for such behavior.
Consequently, if splits can be saved from per se illegality by the
rule of reason, it must be accomplished under the majority rationale
in the White Motor case. It is important to emphasize that the exemp56. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
57. Id. at 255, 256.
58. Id. at 281.
59. Id. at 263.
60. Id. at 267.
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tion from per se illegality extended by that case is narrowly circumscribed. First, the majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas
who also authored some of the Supreme Court's more rigorous expressions of the per se rule.0 ' Second, the exemption is limited to
vertically imposed market divisions; vertically imposed price fixing
having been declared per se illegal in the resale price maintenance
cases.6 2 Third, even this limited dispensation may be temporary, for
61. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
62. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 878 (1911). This
rule has been modified somewhat by United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 800 (1919),
as interpreted and limited in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960),
where the Court held that a manufacturer has the right to announce its policy to refuse

to deal with retailers who do not resell at fixed retail prices and may enforce that policy
by actually refusing to deal with them. If the manufacturer's actions, however, go beyond
a mere refusal to deal, he has transcended the Colgate exception and his actions constitute
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
White Motor seems to be inconsistent with this per se rule against vertically imposed

price fixing, since price fixing has the same economic results as market divisions and has
previously been similarly treated by the courts. See BoRK at 778 n.8. Fortunately for
motion picture exhibitors and distributors, their splitting device is more closely analogous
to the market division in White Motor, than to the resale price maintenance in Dr. Miles.
White Motor and Dr. Miles can however be read as consistent with one another. In
Dr. Miles, the supplier raised in defense of its resale price maintenance program the
vertical argument that without fixed resale prices "confusion and damage" would result.
The Court rejected this defense, stating:
But the advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the dealers ...
It is through the inability of the favored dealers to realize these profits, on account
of the described competition, that the complainant works out its alleged Injury.
220 U.S. at 407.
It was only after finding that the vertical benefit to Dr. Miles was the same as the
benefit to its dealers that the Court went on to equate these vertical restraints with the
horizontal restraints traditionally condemned as per se illegal.
[T]he complainant can fare no better with its plan ... than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions,
and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other. If the immediate
advantage they would thus obtain would not be sufficient to sustain such a direct
agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit to the complainant cannot be regarded as
sufficient to its system.
Id. at 408.
In White Motor, however, the Court was faced with an entirely different situation.
White argued that despite the effect of its territorial market division on the elimination of
horizontal competition among its dealers, the benefits derived from the scheme-energetic
sales and service efforts by its dealers and the avoidance of dealers in some territories
obtaining "free rides" on the sales promotion and service of dealers in other territories-accrued exclusively to White and not to its dealers. Justice Brennan in his concurrence
points to the fact that White's arrangements "bind the dealers to a rather harsh bargain
while leaving the manufacturer unfettered." 872 U.S. at 267. And the majority saw some
horizontal competition if it appeared from the trial that the attendant benefits accrued
directly to White and thereby enabled it to wage more effective competitive warfare.
White Motor and Dr. Miles can be reconciled, therefore, on the ground that what appears
to be a horizontal elimination of competition is per se unlawful unless the restraint Is
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White Motor resulted in nothing more than a remand for trial and
the taking of evidence on the competitive effects of the restraint. As
Justice Douglas stated,
[W]e do not intimate any view on the merits. We only hold
that the legality of the territorial0 3and customer limitations should
be determined only after a trial.
...

Such a trial might have indicated that the justifications for the restraint were illusory or that the anti-competitive effects were too "pernicious."64 In light of these caveats, the White Motor case, to say the
least, is an uncertain precedent. Nevertheless, since the case may indicate the existence of an exception to the per se rule, the possibility
that splits might be defended under White Motor as vertically imposed
market divisions should be considered.
To demonstrate distributor imposition satisfactory under White
Motor, a severe burden of proof must be borne by the distributor.
In addition to proving that he was organizer and architect of the split,
a distributor would probably also have to prove that his sole intent
was to obtain direct and substantial benefits for himself.0 5 While the
strongest case for a distributor would be one in which the exhibitor
vertically imposed, benefits directly the party imposing the scheme, and increases his
competitive potential. In Dr. Miles where no truly vertical benefit was found, the Court
held the price fixing scheme per se illegal; in White Motor where a vertical benefit distinct from the benefit accruing to the dealers from the elimination of competition inter
sese was argued, the Court refused to apply a per se rule and remanded instead for a
trial
This distinction is not without precedent in antitrust law. In fact in the first ease
declaring horizontal market divisions per se illegal, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Judge Taft laid the basis for
this distinction by holding that some restraints on competition were not unlawful if they
were ancillary-collateral and subordinate-to a legitimate main purpose and necessary
to effectuate it. White's restraints would therefore qualify as ancillary to a legitimate main
purpose-waging more effective competition-while Dr. Miles' would not, since, as the
Court found, the elimination of horizontal competition was the main purpose of the
scheme and any vertical benefit derived was only ulterior, indirect and indistinguishable
from the benefit the dealers would derive by eliminating competition inter sese.
63. 372 U.S. at 264.
64. Id. at 262. Unfortunately, from the view of developing law, the White Motor case
was settled by consent decree after remand. United States v. White Motor Co., TRADE REG.
REP. (1964 Trade Cas.)
71195, at 79762 (N.D. Ohio. Sept. 8, 1964).
65.

Thus far, the emphasis has been on the White Motor vertical imposition approach

from the vantage point of the distributor who is joined as a defendant in a suit such as
Viking or Berlin Drive-In; but this defense is, of course, equally available to the exhibitordefendant who has participated in a split. If the White Motor test is met, and the split
is vertically imposed, the existence of a horizontal conspiracy among exhibitors is unlikely
to be established, and the test itself rules out the existence of an exhibitor-distributor
conspiracy in restraint of trade.
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members of a split were unwilling without coercion to accept such
a restraint, a substantial case could probably still be made where the
exhibitors also had something to gain. The important point, however,
is that the benefit to the distributor must be the primary motive for
the agreement to split. 6 If this statement of the law is correct, it is
apparent that mere distributor acquiescence, as required under the
Palmieri rule, could not possibly be sufficient for this purpose. If
White's dealers had divided territories and agreed not to compete, and
then obtained White's acquiescence to their arrangement, the Supreme
Court would unquestionably have held the arrangement per se illegal."7
In most of the cases, however, the splitting arrangement appears to
be a straight exhibitor cartel. 8 Judge Clarie's charge to a Hartford,
Connecticut jury in a suit by an exhibitor against his competitors and
the distributors is representative:
You have heard testimony in this case concerning... splits of
pictures . . by the defendant exhibitors or some of them. So far
as the defendant distributors are concerned the testimony indicated that such splits were the products of arrangements entered
into by the theatre exhibitors and then presented to the distributors, who, while they did not protest against the splits in most
cases, they were not in any case the parties who originated them.0 9
In fact, so representative of splits is this charge that the Second Circuit
unwittingly wrote the existence of an exhibitor cartel into its definition
of a split:
The so-called "split" system, whereby exhibitors divide the
list of available pictures and then approach the distributors separately on that basis, enables them to purchase films at lower
70
prices.
66. The position taken in the text is based upon the reconciliation of Dr. Miles and
White Motor set forth in note 62 supra. The language in those opinions does not reem

to require that the restraint be imposed on unwilling parties in a vertical arrangement
or that the parties upon whom the restraint is imposed receive no benefits from the
restraint. The cases can be reconciled at a level which requires that imposition be motivated by the supplier's interest (regardless of collateral benefits to his dealers) and that
the primary benefit be enjoyed by the supplier.
67. 372 U.S. at 267 (Brennan, J. concurring).
68. In the instances cited in note 6 supra, for example, the facts with which the author
is familiar indicate that the exhibitors agreed among themselves to split and then ap.
proached the distributors for their consent-or simply informed the latter of the fait
accompli. Judge Clarie's charge, text accompanying note 69 infra, and the Second Circuit's
findings in Royster, text accompanying note 70 infra, are typical.
69. Berlin Drive-In Theatre v. Stanley Warner Management Corp., Civil case No. 8501
(D.C. Conn. 1965) (unreported) (Emphasis added).
70. Royster Drive-In Theatres v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
268 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1959).
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Research has disclosed no convincing evidence of distributor imposition, and in some cases even the existence of acquiescence was doubtful. For example, in Viking both the defendants' brief in the Supreme
Court 71 and the Third Circuit's opinion 72 acknowledge uncertainty
about whether all or merely some of the distributors acquiesced to
the split of their product. In such cases defendants cannot possibly
meet the greater burden of showing vertical imposition.
Assuming, however, a hypothetical defendant could show vertical
imposition, only the first hurdle would be cleared. The White Motor
rule of reason would also require a defendant to show genuine economic justification for the vertically imposed split. Justice Douglas in
his opinion for the majority cited only two examples in illustration
of possible justifications for White Motors' otherwise illegal market
division. If these restraints were found to be "protections against aggressive competitors or the only practical means a small company has
for breaking into or staying in business,"7 3 the majority would presumably have approved. Because White Motors was considered a
pygmy in an industry dominated by three of the nation's industrial
giants-General Motors, Ford, Chrysler-Justice Douglas' statement
is especially pro-competitive. And Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion expressed this policy in a more general and yet pointed sense.
Surely it would be significant to the disposition of this case if, as
appellant claims, some such arrangement were a prerequisite for
effective competition on the part of independent manufacturers
of trucks.74
Accordingly, if motion picture distributors are eligible for the limited
dispensation offered by White Motors, they would be required to prove
that splitting of product enables them to compete more effectively
against one another.
In the Viking case, two arguments were made which might satisfy
the criteria established in the Douglas and Brennan White Motor
opinions. The first and only persuasive argument-that "litigation is
lessened when exhibitors agree to a split" 7 5 -must be analyzed within
71. Brief for Respondents, p. 18, nn.19 and 20.
72. 302 F.2d at 292. In this regard, Judge Palmieri's opinion in United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 76373 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). is an interesting study in itself. He devotes
three somewhat confusing pages of discussion to the extensive evidence concerning whether
or not the distributors in fact acquiesced. In such a situation, for defendant exhibitors or
distributors to argue that a distributor imposed the market division d la TI'Iite fotor
would truly be absurd.
73. 372 U.S. at 263.
74. 372 U.S. at 268-69 (Emphasis added).
75. Brief for Amid Curiae, p. 9.
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the peculiar economic and legal milieu of the motion picture industry.
Such an analysis in turn requires a brief digression into the mechanics
and problems of film distribution.
If competitive bidding or negotiation is the modus vivendi, the distributor is faced with the necessity of deciding between largely incomparable offers. It is well known that distributors consider, in
addition to the seating capacity of the competing theatres,
Offered dates of showing-known in the trade as the exhibitor's
availability-length of run promised, amount of clearance over
competitors desired by the exhibitor, percentage of gross receipts
offered, and the parking facilities and physical appointments as
well as the location of each theatre .... 76
The most important of these factors, percentage of gross receipts
offered, is itself likely to vary from offer to offer. In the Viking record,
for example, it developed that
[t]here were proposals in which film rental was based on a flat
percentage of weekly gross receipts less house costs for each week,
the percentage remaining constant. There were others in which
film rental was based on a scale of percentages adjusted downwardly week by week. There were still others in which film rental
was based on a sliding scale of percentages, the proposal providing
for the upward or downward
adjustment of percentages . . . de77
pending on gross receipts.
Additionally, some offers contain cash guarantees payable in the event
earned film rental falls below the amount of the guarantee. Merely to
state these myriad considerations is to illustrate the extreme difficulty
a distributor would face if required to prove that he made a completely
objective judgment of the relative merits of the conflicting offers.
However, this type of judgment is exactly what the governing law of
the industry requires. The Paramount decrees require that each film
be offered theatre by theatre, and that all exhibitors be given a fair
opportunity to obtain whatever film is released.78 By fixing such re76.

COMMENT at 1086.
77. 320 F.2d at 289.
78. See COMMENT at 1085 n.171. For history and background of the Paramount
case, see generally, CONANT, ANTITRUsT IN THE MOTION P1cTuRE INDUSTRY (1960). In United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the Government won a total
victory over the eight major motion picture distributors (five of which were Integrated
production-distribution-exhibition companies) under section one of the Sherman Act.
Those companies which were integrated with exhibition chains were forced to divorce
them completely, retaining no vestige of control over them; and all distribution companies were enjoined from favoring their former subsidiaries, from offering films for
license in any way other than theatre by theatre, film by film, from granting discrimina.
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quirements, the decrees have provided a cause of action to countless
exhibitors throughout the country who consider themselves unjustly
treated.7 9 Although many of these suits have been unjustified, the
validity of the claims made in the majority is impossible to assess
without lengthy and costly litigation.
No one in the industry would dispute the fact that distributors
have expended large amounts of their resources in defending against
exhibitor suits. Splitting, by eliminating competition in the bidding
or negotiating for films, also eliminates the possibility of having an
aggrieved party, since only one exhibitor in any particular split territory will negotiate for any particular film. Thus it may be true that
distributors spend more in defending against exhibitor suits than
would be lost by imposing splits on exhibitors. The net gain might
be employed by distributors for increased and improved production,
more efficient distribution, and thus more effective competition. The
argument based on litigation costs is even more compelling when one
recalls that in ParamountJustice Douglas, also the majority's spokesman in the White Motor case, expunged from the lower court's decree
the requirement that all films be licensed through competitive bidding.
His argument in Paramountraised the same considerations concerning
the complexity of bidding and the likelihood of extensive litigation
involving the federal courts in the day-to-day conduct of the industry.8 0
tory runs or clearances; and from such common practices as blind booking, block booking.
signing franchise agreements, etc. See generally, CONANr, supra, passim, and Com.Nr at
1085, 1103-04.
79. The Viking case is itself typical, being originally tried on the theory that plaintiff's
competitors, Stanley Warner and Goldman, had conspired with the distributors to dis-

criminate against him. See text preceding note I supra. The Federal Reports are crammed
with similar cases; see the Defendant-Plaintiff Tables, 55, 56 MOD. FEa. Pac. Dic., and
cumulative Annual Pocket Parts, under the titles Loew's, Inc., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., Paramount Pictures,
Inc., and Universal Pictures Co. The several hundred cases listed therein, and in the
tables of contents of the various volumes of CCH TaAE CAsES, do not, of course, invariably involve complaints of conspiratorial discrimination by theatre owners; but the
great majority unquestionably do. Attorneys for the defendant Stanley Warner Corp. have
explained to the author that avoidance of further litigation with William Goldman, one
of the major figures in the. dramatis personae of the Viking case, was itself one of the
prime causes of the Philadelphia split. He was one of the most tenacious and successful
antitrust plaintiffs of all time. See William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 54
F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. Pa. 1944), ret'd, 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945); 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa.
1946), bill of review denied, 163 F.2d 241 (1947), af'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 US. 811 (1948). $375,000 in treble damages were awarded to Goldman. Petition
for additional relief was denied, 83 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
80. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 162-64 (1948). The argument that since the Paramount opinion and decrees did not require competitive bidding,
an exhibitor cartel is justified (see Judge Palmieri's statement in United States v. Loew's,
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The litigation argument is limited in its availability to the defense
of splits which include all exhibitors in the area on any particular
run. Because non-participating exhibitors are always free to "bid across
the split" and the distributors are always free to award licenses to the
highest offerors, the possibilities of litigation are hardly lessened if any
significant exhibitor is not a member of the split.
The second argument in Viking-that a split "helps the distributor
keep the exhibitors, who are his outlets, in business" 8 1 -is typical of
those which the courts should consider unacceptable. It is the old and
discredited horizontal argument-ruinous competition-made to look
vertical and as such it was properly rejected by the Supreme Court in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.8 2 and the other resale price maintenance cases. s3 There may well be other arguments
which would indicate that distributor imposed splits enhance the competitive standing of distributors. It may be assumed, however, that
any such arguments would further illustrate the fundamental tension
which underlies an attempt to justify splits under the rule of White
Motor. This tension demands that any court faced with such an attempt analyze the arguments carefully and weigh the possible benefits
to competition against the economic injury caused by splits. Ultimately
it may be necessary for the Supreme Court to hold that on balance
84
splits "may be too dangerous to sanction.
Inc., 1962 Trade Gas. gJ70347, at 76374 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); and Brief for Amid Curiae, p. 9,
Viking Theatre, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 378 U.S. 123 (1964)), must, of course, be
completely rejected. The argument from Paramount is available only in a case where the
defendants have brought themselves within the White Motor dispensation, having passed
the first hurdle by showing that the split was vertically imposed.
81. Brief for Amid Curiae, p. 10. The defendants made the same argument in a somewhat more sophisticated manner:
The more theatres doing business, the higher a distributor's total income. The dlstributor has an obvious interest in the economic success of a large number of exhibitor
customers. The decline in the number of theatres which followed the advent of television, and the consequent decrease in the number of films produced, certainly
warrants a distributor's concern for the preservation of as many outlets as possible.
Brief for Respondents, p. 37. This "preservation of outlets" theory has, it should be noted,
failed dismally in the resale price maintenance cases, where suppliers have tried to justify
maintenance of higher profit margins for their dealers through vertically imposed price
fixing. See discussion note 66 supra, and see, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis (nd Co.
and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., note 62 supra.
82. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See note 62 supra.
83. See note 49 supra.
84. In remanding, Justice Douglas stated:
They [White's territorial restraints] may be too dangerous to sanction or they may
be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means
a small company has for breaking into or staying in business.
Id. at 263.
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